Yesterday I read Alan Greenspan’s recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine (hat tip Rhoda Schermer). It is entitled “Never Saw It Coming: Why the Financial Crisis Took Economists By Surprise,” and for those of you who want to save some time, it basically goes like this:
I’ll admit it, the macroeconomic models that we used before the crisis failed, because we assumed
people financial firms behaved rationally. But now there are new models that assume predictable irrational behavior, and once we add those bells and whistles onto our existing models, we’ll be all good. Y’all can start trusting economists again.
Here’s the thing that drives me nuts about Greenspan. He is still talking about financial firms as if they are single people. He just didn’t really read Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, or at least didn’t understand it, because if he had, he’d have seen that Adam Smith argued against large firms in which the agendas of the individuals ran counter to the agenda of the company they worked for.
If you think about individuals inside the banks, in other words, then their individual incentives explain their behavior pretty damn well. But Greenspan ignores that and still insists on looking at the bank as a whole. Here’s a quote from the piece:
Financial firms accepted the risk that they would be unable to anticipate the onset of a crisis in time to retrench. However, they thought the risk was limited, believing that even if a crisis developed, the seemingly insatiable demand for exotic financial products would dissipate only slowly, allowing them to sell almost all their portfolios without loss. They were mistaken.
Let’s be clear. Financial firms were not “mistaken”, because legal contracts can’t think. As for the individuals working inside those firms, there was no such assumption about a slow exhale. Everyone was furiously getting their bonuses pumped up while the getting was good. People on the inside knew the market for exotic financial products would blow at some point, and that their personal risks were limited, so why not make systemic risk worse until then.
As a mathematical modeler myself, it bugs me to try to put a mathematical band-aid on an inherently failed model. We should instead build a totally new model, or even better remove the individual perverted incentives of the market using new rules (I’m using the word “rules” instead of “regulations” because people don’t hate rules as much as they hate regulations).
Wouldn’t it be nice if the agendas of the individuals inside a financial firm were more closely aligned with the financial firm? And if it was over a long period of time instead of just until the bonus day? Not impossible.
And, since I’m an occupier, I get to ask even more. Namely, wouldn’t it be even nicer if that agenda was also shared by the general public? Doable!
Mr. Greenspan, there are ways to address the mistake you economists made and continue to make, but they don’t involve fancier math models from behavioral economics. They involve really simple rule changes and, generally speaking, making finance much more boring and much less profitable.
Last night I watched this interview by Yves Smith and Dean Baker on billmoyers.com. I recommend it for everyone interested in learning about the secret “free trade” agreement currently under negotiation between the U.S. and a bunch of other countries which touch the Pacific Ocean.
The interview will explain why “free trade” is in quotes, because it’s really more about protecting corporate interests and extending patents than about reducing obstacles to trade:
As a member of Alt Banking, I’m particularly outraged by the financial regulation part of the treaty, which sound like a race to the bottom in terms of common laws between the countries. But probably the worst part of the treaty is related to pharmaceutical protectionism.
Near the end of the interview there’s an appeal, involving a monetary award, for people on the inside to come out and show the world exactly what the contents of the treaty contain. The award is sponsored by WikiLeaks and is crowdsourced: it currently stands at $61,252. So you can add to it if you want to sweeten the pot.
It’s kind of hard to believe, but it’s true: many of the problems that led up to the financial crisis are still with us and simply haven’t been addressed.
- There are too few banks, and they are too interconnected. This is still a huge problem, and it’s called “Too Big To Fail.”
- In fact they’re so big they can engage in criminal activity and not fear prosecution. Still true, and it’s got a name too, “Too Big To Jail.”
- Also, the credit rating agencies, who get paid by debt issuers for AAA ratings on crappy debt? They’re still alive, there are still only three of them, and they still rate debt.
- Also, remember the LIBOR rate manipulations? Still being run by asking individual traders what they’ve been paying recently, and the answers are still being taken on faith. Oh, and they’ve been asked “not be located in close proximity to traders who primarily deal in derivative products” based on Libor. That’ll work, because nobody know how to text!
I’d like to perform a thought experiment for this last one, because it seems like a solvable problem, although I will confess up front that I don’t have a solution off the top of my head. That’s where you readers come in.
Just a little background. LIBOR is (supposedly) the very short-term interest rate that banks pay each other for loans. A huge pile – hundreds of trillions of dollars worth – of derivatives in the form of futures, swaps, and loans are tied to the LIBOR, and most of them seems to reference the three-month rate. Here’s a NY Times graphic explaining how it works and explaining how the fraud played out at Barclay’s.
So what are the attributes of the benchmark that make LIBOR so important and so widely used? And how would we start using something else instead?
Let’s answer that second question first. If we could find another 3-month benchmark rate with good properties, we could start writing contracts based on the new rate from now on, while continuing to compute LIBOR until the existing contracts have played out and LIBOR would be grandfathered out of the market.
Now on to the first question, a list critical attributes of this rate.
- It’s supposed to reflect very short-term kinds of risk, which means you don’t want to base it on, say, long term treasuries.
- It should be public data, so we don’t have manipulation behind the scenes
- But it shouldn’t be based on a market that is so small that it is worth losing money on that small market to manipulate the new LIBOR rates. Remember, the derivatives market that uses that rate is enormous, so if we base the rate on a smallish if transparent market, that would just invite market manipulation for that small market.
- The point of LIBOR-based derivatives is that it’s a floating rate, which means that as credit gets tighter or looser so does the rate references in a given derivative. But of course LIBOR is a very bank-specific kind of credit. So it’s not just “as credit gets tighter or looser” but rather “as interbank credit gets tighter or looser” (and here I’m ignoring the manipulation, since when bank credit actually got tighter, it wasn’t actually reflected in LIBOR rates).
- So I guess my question is, do we actually want bank-specific credit rates? Isn’t it good enough to have a market-wide concept of credit tightness? For most people who own one side of those LIBOR-based derivatives, I’m sure their own access to credit matters more to them than some London bank’s access, although I’m also sure there’s a relationship between the two.
I’m asking you readers to put up suggestions or explain how we can do without LIBOR altogether.
Yesterday we had a great discussion in our Alternative Banking Book Club about municipal financing, based on the sixth chapter in our book Occupy Finance called A Civics Lesson: Wall Street Feasts on the Commons. The conversation was kindly led by Tom Sgouros, a policy analyst and author from Rhode Island, which seems to be a hotbed of super terrible muni financing.
It was explained that shady deals in muni finance is all over the map, from price fixing in municipal bond deals, which is corruption strictly on the side of the big banks who finance the town’s deals to accounting tricks, where it takes the collusion of town officials to enter into shady and inappropriate contracts.
The thing I’d never really understood until yesterday was how people used Capital Appreciation Bonds to play tricks with their accounting, and specifically with their town’s debt limits.
Context around muni financing
A little more context, although I’m no expert (experts, please add details or correct me if I’ve misrepresented anything). Please also read the chapter, which is excellent and much broader.
First of all, by “municipalities” we mean towns and cities (actually, states and counties, too, not to mention water authorities, economic development agencies, school departments, and all the rest of the “not-federal-not-corporate”). So a town needs to borrow money for something, maybe to pay its workers, maybe to build something or maintain its roads. It borrows money from investors by issuing a muni bond, and the big banks help set that up. Investors invest in these bonds because they have special tax treatment, because they rarely default, and because they want to support their local communities.
But as you can imagine, the big banks have much more expertise on what kind of prices to expect and the level of sophistication it requires to do due diligence, and then if you add into that mix the fact that local town officials are often temporary, ignorant, and desperate, we get a toxic environment. There are lots of examples of this problem, and often they are covered up by the local towns because of associated embarrassment, complicity, and shame. Seriously, it’s awful, and we only hear about some of them like in Detroit and Stockton, when things are incredibly awful. Matt Taibbi has done an amazing job chronicling this stuff.
Anyhoo, with that backdrop, you can imagine that there are bad situations handed to town officials when they enter office, and they are confronted with a major league problem: they need to come up with money now to pay something basic like school teachers or firemen, but there’s no cash. And plus there’s a debt limit which they’re already pushing up against.
Enter the Capital Appreciation Bond (CAB). It’s a zero-coupon bond, which is already weird. For most muni bonds, towns regularly – quarterly or annually – pay interest or so-called amortizing sums, very much as an individual homeowner might pay monthly for their mortgages, where most of it goes to interest but every month a little bit of the principal is paid off too.
But for CABs, you get some money now and you pay nothing at all until it’s due, at which point you pay it all back at once.
Very very long term debt
You may have even forgotten about it by then, though, because the second weird thing about CABs is that the loans are often very very long term – as in 30 or 40 years. So, given the nature of the set-up and the nature of compound interest, you can end up paying something like 7 times the original amount after that much time.
For example, we see a school district like San Mateo in California borrowing $190 million recently that, when the bond comes due, will owe $1 billion. And it’s widespread in California: according to this article, 200 California school and community college districts issuing these bonds will end up paying 10 to 20 times more than they borrowed.
Accounting practices and CABs
That brings me to the third weirdest property of CABs, namely how they look on balance sheets for accounting purposes.
Namely, and here I need to confess that I’ve been a very bad accounting student, the towns only have to write the original loan down on the balance sheet as a liability, not the eventual pay-out. This is in contrast with other kinds of very similar zero-coupon bonds where you have to write down the eventual payment you will owe, not the amount you start with.
Someone please explain this discrepancy in the field of accounting!! It makes no sense to me. If the cash flows are the same for two different kinds of bonds, how do you get to account for them differently?
In any case, the consequences of this accounting trick are real. In particular it means that, for desperate town officials trying to pay their workers, or even shady town officials trying to get away with stuff, CABs are very attractive indeed, because it looks kind of innocuous and their overall debt limits don’t get breached even though they’ve essentially sold the future of the town to a big Wall Street bank. Plus they won’t be in office when that bill comes due, and they might well be dead.
Some California officials are trying to make CABs illegal or at least restricted, and some states like Michigan and Ohio have already passed laws against them. But given how much money they make for big banks, there are serious headwinds for reasonable rules.
So there’s a new podcast called Disorderly Conduct which “explores finance without a permit” and is hosted by Alexis Goldstein, whom I met through her work on Occupy the SEC, and Jesse Myerson, and activist and a writer.
I was recently a very brief guest on their “In the Weeds” feature, where I was asked to answer the question, ”What is the single best way to rein in the power of Wall Street?” in three minutes. The answers given by:
- The Other 98% organizer Nicole Carty (@nacarty),
- Salon.com contributing writer David Dayen (@ddayen),
- Americans for Financial Reform Policy Director Marcus Stanley (@MarcusMStanley), and
- Marxist militant José Martín (@sabokitty)
Occupy Finance video series
We’ve been having our Occupy Finance book club meetings every Sunday, and although our group has decided not to record them, a friend of our group and a videographer in her own right, Donatella Barbarella, has started to interview the authors and post them on YouTube. The first few interviews have made their way to the interwebs:
- Linda talking about Chapter 1: Financialization and the 99%.
- Me talking about Chapter 2: the Bailout
- Tamir talking about Chapter 3: How banks work
Doing Data Science now out!
O’Reilly is releasing the book today. I can’t wait to see a hard copy!! And when I say “hard copy,” keep in mind that all of O’Reilly’s books are soft cover.
Akshat is a member of Occupy the SEC  and came to talk to us about a short history of financial regulation, and how impressively well things worked in the middle of the last century, when Glass-Steagall was in effect and before it was gamed.
One thing he mentioned in his fascinating hour-long lecture was this lawsuit which I hadn’t heard about. Namely, Occupy the SEC sued the Federal Reserve, SEC, CFTC, OCC, FDIC and U.S. Treasury over not doing their jobs, specifically for the delay in finishing and implementing the Volcker Rule.
You see, Dodd-Frank is a law, and the Volcker Rule, which is supposed to be something like a modern Glass-Steagall act, is part of it. But the law just outlines the rules, and the regulators are supposed to actually turn that law into regulations which they then implement.
There was a deadline for that, and it has passed. So Occupy the SEC sued to make those guys get the job done.
And guess what? The judge found that they didn’t have standing to sue. I’m no lawyer but from what I can understand this means they were deemed not sufficiently relevant to the implementation of Dodd-Frank. They didn’t have enough skin in the game, in other words. Because they’re just, you know, citizens who care about having a functional regulatory environment. Not to mention taxpayers who have bailed out the banks and want to avoid continuing doing that.
That begs the question, who has skin in the regulation game? Answer: banks being regulated. So only those guys can complain to the courts about the regulation. And obviously their complaints will be different from Occupy the SEC’s complaints.
It seems like whenever I look around I see examples like this, where there are people getting away with crappy policies or even crappier deeds because it has a negative effect, but that negative effect is so dispersed that most people don’t have enough “standing” to sue or to even effectively quantify how they’ve been affected.
And I guess this is the land of class-action lawsuits, but that doesn’t seem sufficient. It really seems like there needs to be legal representation for taxpayers somehow. Who is looking out for the average non-insider? Who is keeping tabs on overall systemic risk? In an ideal world that would exist inside the regulators themselves, but we all know it’s not that ideal.
2. Which, if you don’t know, consists of an amazing and wonky group of occupiers who write public commenting letters on financial regulation. Their Volcker Rule comments have made quite an impression on regulators, but they’ve also written numerous amicus briefs on various issues as well. Keep an eye on their work on their webpage.
Sometimes my plan of getting up super early to write on my blog fails, and this is one of those days. But I’m still going to ask you to read this article from the New Yorker written by Lisa Servon and entitled, “The High Cost, For The Poor, Of Using A Bank.” Here’s a key passage, but the whole thing is amazing, and yes, I’ve invited her to my Occupy group already:
To understand why, consider loans of small amounts. People criticize payday loans for their high annual percentage rates (APR), which range from three hundred per cent to six hundred per cent. Payday lenders argue that APR is the wrong measure: the loans, they say, are designed to be repaid in as little as two weeks. Consumer advocates counter that borrowers typically take out nine of these loans each year, and end up indebted for more than half of each year.
But what alternative do low-income borrowers have? Banks have retreated from small-dollar credit, and many payday borrowers do not qualify anyway. It happens that banks offer a de-facto short-term, high-interest loan. It’s called an overdraft fee. An overdraft is essentially a short-term loan, and if it had a repayment period of seven days, the APR for a typical incident would be over five thousand per cent.
It makes me wonder whether, if someone did a careful analysis with all-in costs including time and travel, whether PayDay Lenders are not actually a totally rational choice for the poor.
I left finance pretty disgusted with the whole thing, and because I needed to make money and because I’m a nerd, I pretty quickly realized I could rebrand myself a “data scientist” and get a pretty cool job, and that’s what I did. Once I started working in the field, though, I was kind of shocked by how positive everyone was about the “big data revolution” and the “power of data science.”
Not to underestimate the power of data––it’s clearly powerful! And big data has the potential to really revolutionize the way we live our lives for the better––or sometimes not. It really depends.
From my perspective, this was, in tenor if not in the details, the same stuff we’d been doing in finance for a couple of decades and that fields like advertising were slow to pick up on. And, also from my perspective, people needed to be way more careful and skeptical of their powers than they currently seem to be. Because whereas in finance we need to worry about models manipulating the market, in data science we need to worry about models manipulating people, which is in fact scarier. Modelers, if anything, have a bigger responsibility now than ever before.
There have been two articles in the New York Times very recently concerning empathy.
First, there was this Opinionator piece about how rich people have less empathy. Second, there was this Well blogpost which reports on a study that implies you can improve your empathy skills, at least in the short term, by reading literary fiction like Chekhov.
Empathy means understanding and sharing the feelings of other people. So what do these two columns actually refer to?
For rich people, it’s mostly about attention rather than empathy. The idea is that researchers study how people pay attention to people (answer: they pay attention to high status people more), and found that rich people don’t do it much at all. They claim attention is a prerequisite for empathy, and that there’s a negative feedback loop going on with the rich, a lack of empathy, and increasing inequality.
As for the literary fiction column, it cites a study in which what they measure is something a little bit different, namely the “theory of mind” of a person after reading Checkhov versus something else. The concept of the theory of mind is that we have internal models of other people’s mindset, and actually they claim to be able to separate this into two parts, cognitive and affective. So if I have a realistic impression of what you’re feeling, we say that my affective theory of mind is good, whereas if I have a realistic impression of how you’re planning to act, that’s called nailing a cognitive theory of mind.
A few comments:
- I’m not so sure about the attention-leads-to-empathy assumption. Sometimes I am on a subway and I start sensing people’s emotions around me whether I like it or not, even when I’m trying not to pay attention to them. For me empathy is like smell, and some people are incredibly smelly, especially on the subway.
- On the other hand it resonates with me that rich people have less empathy. Certainly this seemed to be the case when I worked at D.E. Shaw, although it might have been a self-selection thing: maybe people who are not empathetic are attracted to working at a hedge fund.
- In any case, there’s a tremendous disconnect between regular people and the attitude of finance people, along the lines of “I’m smarter than those people so I deserve to be rich”, and I ascribe much of this disconnect to a lack of empathy.
- In both of these columns, though, the question was how well do you pay attention to, and read, people in the same room with you. Unfortunately that’s not a good enough question, at least if you’re worried about that negative feedback loop, if you think about the real world. In the real world, even in New York, rich people don’t spend lots of time in the same room with anyone except other rich people. So it’s a bigger problem to address than what you might at first think.
- Having said that, I don’t claim that if everyone just had more empathy all our problems would be solved. Even so I do think it might help. Certainly my sensitivity to other people’s emotions deeply affects me and my actions and goals, but of course that’s too little evidence to go by.
- In any case it’s an interesting thought experiment to imagine a world of increased empathy. I like that it’s being considered as a basic attribute of interest, and that it seems tweakable.
- Conclusion: before talking to someone I perceive as unempathetic, I will bust out a Checkov short story (this one) and demand they read it on the spot. That should really help.
I’m preparing for a short trip to D.C. this week to take part in a day-long event held by Americans for Financial Reform. You can get the announcement here online, but I’m not sure what the finalized schedule of the day is going to be. Also, I believe it will be recorded, but I don’t know the details yet.
In any case, I’m psyched to be joining this, and the AFR are great guys doing important work in the realm of financial reform.
Opening Wall Street’s Black Box: Pathways to Improved Financial Transparency
Sponsored By Americans for Financial Reform and Georgetown University Law Center
Keynote Speaker: Gary Gensler Chair, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
October 11, 2013 10 AM – 3 PM
Georgetown Law Center, Gewirz Student Center, 12th Floor
120 F Street NW, Washington, DC (Judiciary Square Metro) (Space is limited. Please RSVP to AFRtransparencyrsvp@gmail.com)
The 2008 financial crisis revealed that regulators and many sophisticated market participants were in the dark about major risks and exposures in our financial system. The lack of financial transparency enabled large-scale fraud and deception of investors, weakened the stability of the financial system, and contributed to the market failure after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Five years later, despite regulatory efforts, it’s not clear how much the situation has improved.
Join regulators, market participants, and academic experts for an exploration of the progress made – and the work that remains to be done – toward meaningful transparency on Wall Street. How can better information and disclosure make the financial system both fairer and safer?
|Jesse Eisinger, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the New York Times and Pro Publica|
|Zach Gast, Head of financial sector research, Center on Financial Research and Analysis|
|Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the FSOC, United States Treasury|
|Henry Hu, Alan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance, University of Texas Law School|
|Albert “Pete” Kyle, Charles E. Smith Professor of Finance, University of Maryland|
|Adam Levitan, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center|
|Antoine Martin, Vice President, New York Federal Reserve Bank|
|Brad Miller, Former Representative from North Carolina; Of Counsel, Grais & Ellsworth|
|Cathy O’Neil, Senior Data Scientist, Johnson Research Labs; Occupy Alternative Banking|
|Gene Phillips, Director, PF2 Securities Evaluation|
|Greg Smith, Author of “Why I Left Goldman Sachs”; former Goldman Sachs Executive Director|
My buddy Jordan Ellenberg sent me this link to an article which covered Sir Andrew Wiles’ comments at a the opening of the Andrew Wiles Building, a housing complex for math nerds in Oxford. From the article:
Wiles claimed that the abuse of mathematics during the global financial meltdown in 2009, particularly by banks’ manipulation of complex derivatives, had tarnished his chosen subject’s reputation.
He explained that scientists used to worry about the ethical repercussions of their work and that mathematics research, which used to be removed from day-to-day life, has diverged “towards goals that you might not believe in”.
At one point Wiles said the following, which is music to my ears coming from a powerful mathematician:
One has to be aware now that mathematics can be misused and that we have to protect its good name.
First, maybe I should invite Wiles to be on my panel of mathematicians for investigating public math models. I originally thought this should be run under the auspices of a society such as the AMS but after talking to some people I’ve given up on that and just want it to be independent.
Second, the Andrew Wiles building was evidently paid for primarily by Landon Clay, who also founded the Clay Institute and was the CEO of Eaton Vance, which an investment management firm which provides its clients with wealth management tools and advice. I’m wondering if that kind of mathematical tool was in Wiles’ mind when he made his speech, and if so, how it went over. Certainly in my experience, wealth management tools are definitely in the “weapons of math destruction” toolbox.
I was reading this Bloomberg article about the internal risk models at JP Morgan versus Goldman Sachs, and it hit me: I too had an urge for the SEC to hire the insiders at Goldman Sachs to help them “understand risk” at every level. Why not hire a small team of Goldman Sachs experts to help the SEC combat bullshit like what happened with the London Whale?
After all, Goldman people know risk. They probably knew risk even better before 1999, when they went IPO and the partners stopped being personally liable for losses. But even now, of all the big players on the street, Goldman is known for being a few steps ahead of everyone else when it comes to a losing trade.
So it’s natural to want someone from deeply within that culture to come spread their technical risk wisdom to the other side, the regulators.
Unfortunately that’s never what actually happens. Instead of getting the technical knowledge of how to think about risk, how to model a portfolio to squirrel out black holes of mystery, the revolving door instead keeps outputting crazy freaks like Jon Corzine, who blow up firms through, ironically, taking ridiculous risks at the first opportunity.
So, why does this happen? Some possibilities:
- Goldman Sachs promotes crazy freaks because they make great leaders while constrained inside a disciplined culture of calculated risks, but when they get outside they go nuts. This is kind of the model of Mormon children who are finally allowed out into the world and engage in tons of sex and drugs.
- On the flip side, perhaps Goldman Sachs keeps the people who actually understand the technical part of risk very deep in the machine and these guys never get leave the building at all.
- Or maybe, people who understand risk sometimes do go through the revolving door, but they don’t share their knowledge with the other side, because their incentives have changed once they’re outside.
- In other words, they don’t help the regulators understand how banks lie and cheat to regulators, because they’re too busy watering down regulation so their buddies can continuously lie and cheat to regulators.
Whatever the case, for whatever reason we keep using the revolving door in hopes that someone will eventually tell us the magic that Goldman Sachs knows, but we never quite get anyone like that, and that means the the SEC and other regulators are woefully unprepared for the kind of tricks that banks have up their sleeves.
It’s almost 15 minutes long, and the first couple of minutes are concerned with the housing market, which he has strong opinions on and I don’t, but then he moves on to financial regulation, the question of accountability, municipal bankruptcies, and whether economists suck at their jobs, subjects I care about a lot.
It’s a super interesting interview, and I’m planning to mail Thornberg a copy of Occupy Finance soon. Even though he serves on the advisory board of hedge fund Paulson & Co, he agrees with lots of people who come to Alternative Banking on many issues.
A few examples of what he’s talking about for those of you without 15 minutes to spend on him.
He talks about how Dodd-Frank is collapsing in on itself through extensive watering-down and lobbying, and how negotiations over how much “skin in the game” is required around securitization is the death knell of that process.
He talks about how the overall system is under-regulated and not being made accountable. He claims that, instead of trying to draw lines in the sand, we should try to attack the skewed incentives. A lot of people got very rich doing very bad things, he says, and the continued existence of those messed-up incentives will encourage a whole new generation to do the same.
For example, bonuses shouldn’t be given on how many loans you push out into the market but how they perform. We should be able to clawback money, which is to say pull back money from someone who’s done something bad. After all, he points out, Dick Fuld and Angelo Mozilo as men who became filthy rich from doing bad things and are now “untouchable”.
He also points out that D.C. never went through a recession because of money coming in through lobbying. His top two priorities to improve our system would be:
- To simplify the tax code, both corporate and personal. There too many special interests. Get rid of complexity and make it more progressive.
- Political reform. We like to say the Chinese are “one-party state”. But are we really two-party? We have very little “choice” especially if you take into account the gerrymandering. California is doing a good job reforming here.
Next, he moves onto municipal emergencies in Detroit, Stockton, and San Bernadino. All three city bankruptcies pose the fundamental decisions: what is the sanctity of public pensions? State laws generally insist that pensions be paid.
The issue here is, says Thornberg, that federal bankruptcy laws trump, not state law. So the relevant federal judge can say “too bad” to the contract, and the pensioners will be forced to take a cut like all the other debtholders.
Lawyers in the know think pensions are gonna go, and that precedent for this kind of thing is being established in these three cities in the very near future.
The Reuters interviewer addressed the issue that, generally speaking, economists missed the oncoming crisis. Does that mean there’s something wrong with economics?
Thornberg: “Professors don’t get published writing papers about the current economy – nobody cares about that.”
He claims that, yes, economists should be more on top of day-to-day stuff, but he claims that the critique misses the broader point, which is that everyone needs to be a better economist. He claims it is a social science which tries to address why people do what they do. And although economists would like to think of it as a mathematical science, they’re wrong to do so.
His advice: don’t listen to economists on TV. Educate yourself and know your source. It’s amazing how much stock we put into economists working for, say, the National Association of Realtors who get paid to say good things like, “it’s a good time to buy and sell a house!”
Tomorrow evening I’m meeting with the Columbia Data Science Society and talking to them – who as I understand it are mostly engineers - about “how to think like a data scientist”.
On October 11th I’ll be in D.C. sitting on a panel discussion organized by the Americans for Financial Reform. It’s part of a day-long event on the topic of transparency in financial regulation. The official announcement isn’t out yet but I’ll post it here as soon as I can. I’ll be giving my two cents on what mathematical tools can do and cannot do with respect to this stuff.
Finally, I’m going to Harvard on October 30th to give a talk in their Applied Statistics Workshop series. I haven’t figured out exactly what I’m talking about but it will be something nerdy and skeptical.
The idea is for the author of each chapter to come and lead a discussion about the subject in that chapter. We expect the feedback to improve the topic and be incorporated into the 2nd edition of the book.
Where: The book club will meet from 2-3pm on the Sundays mentioned below, before the regular Alternative Banking meeting, in Room 402 or 409 of the International Affairs Building of Columbia University at Amsterdam and 118th.
Here’s the schedule:
Occupy Finance Book Club Schedule
Yesterday was pretty amazing, in spite of the fact that we realized a page was missing from the book. The missing page, which was supposed to be between pages 38 and 39, is available here.
UPDATE: the online version of Occupy Finance is now complete.
Hey, but it’s still a great book, and we got lots of fantastic press. Here’s the list so far:
- FT Alphaville with Lisa Pollack
- NPR with Margot Adler
- Bloomberg with Matt Levine
- New York Times with William Alden
- Daily Kos with medicalquack
Thank you guys!
And readers, if you really want a copy of the book, send me email with your address. Our group meeting this Sunday will consist of an envelope-stuffing party. My email address is on my “About” page.
Hey, what are you doing for the 2nd anniversary of the occupation of Zuccotti Park?
I know what I’m doing, namely going down to the park and handing out hundreds of copies of my occupy group’s new book – now on scribd!!. Here’s a ridiculous gif of the pile of books that came from the printer yesterday with my kindergartner posing by it (you might need to click on it to see the animation!!):
I’m also planning a small speech at 10:15am,
which I’m still writing. I’ll post it here later. here it is:
Thank you for coming
Thank you for occupying
I am here today to announce a birth
The birth of a book
It’s called “Occupy Finance”
We wrote it
we are Alternative Banking
Who are we?
We are a working group of Occupy
we first met almost two years ago
we have been meeting ever since
we meet every Sunday afternoon
at Columbia University
our meetings are totally open
we want you to come
We discuss the financial system
we discuss financial regulation
we discuss how lobbyists destroy regulation
we discuss how Obama destroys regulation
we discuss what we can do to help
how we can make our opinions known
how we can make the system work for us
Last year we had a project
The 52 Shades of Greed
we came here to Zuccotti Park
we gave out hundreds of packs of cards
they explained the financial system
they called out the criminals
they called out the toxic ideas
and the toxic instruments
and the toxic institutions
that started this mess
This year we’ve come back
with another present to share
it’s a book we wrote
it’s a book for all of us
it explains how the financial system works
and how it doesn’t work
it explains how the system uses us
how the bankers scam us all
how the regulators fail to do their job
how the politicians have been bought
Why did we write this book?
we wrote it for you
and we wrote it for us
we wrote it for anyone
who wants to know
how to argue against
the side of greed
the side of corruption
the side of entitlement
let me tell you something
some people call us radicals
but listen up
when the top 1%
capture 95% of the income gains
since the so-called end
of the recession,
when more than half the country thinks
that we didn’t do enough
to put bankers in jail,
when the median household income
has gone down 7.3% since 2007,
when the actual employment rate
is 5% below 2007,
when the jobs that do exist are crappy
when we get paid with prepaid debit cards
that nickel and dime us all
then what we demand is not radical
it is only a system that works
we are asking for a just system
we are asking for a fair system
we are asking for an end to too-big-to-fail
we demand banks take less risk
with our money
and we are asking lawmakers
to stop banks
once and for all
from scamming people because they are poor
Please join us
we want you to come
you don’t need to be an expert
we started out as strangers
who wanted to know how things work
we have become friends
we have become allies
we have made something
out of our curiousity
and out of our hard work
and we are here today
to share that with you
and to ask you to join us
please join us
happy birthday to us!
So yesterday there I was with my Occupy group, we’d just gone over our plans for the second anniversary of Occupy Wall Street this coming Tuesday. We talked over releasing our book and the press conference in Zuccotti Park at 10:15am. We talked over the group’s web presence and how we had to improve it a bit before then, what flyers to hand out with the book, and how to get everyone copies of the book before then. In other words, logistics.
Then we turned to the content of the meeting, namely working on our op-ed focused on Larry Summers and why he shouldn’t be named the Fed Chair.
We’d brainstormed about it last week, and I put together a crappy first draft, and then another in our group had blown away my milquetoast logical argument with a couple of paragraphs of pure Occupy outrage. We were thinking about how to combine them, and we were also trying to decide whether to come up with a list of better candidates or just say “anyone would be better than Larry Summers.”
All of a sudden, someone in our group, who had been browsing the web in search for better candidates, suddenly interjects that “Larry Summers has withdrawn from consideration for the Fed job!”
That’s some good fucking karma.
And yes, it’s a pretty awesome moment when exactly what you’re working towards comes true like that, even if it’s only one thing on a very long list.
Here’s the next thing on the list: Too Big To Fail needs to end, people. Someone named Scott Cahoon sent me a video regarding that very topic last night which advertises his book called “Too Big Has Failed,” available on Amazon.
p.s. also, it’s been 5 years since the crisis, and not enough has changed.
Holy shit I’m just about bursting with pride to announce that my Occupy group’s book, Occupy Finance, is coming out Tuesday and is at the printer right now.
This is thanks in large part to all of you awesome people who sent contributions for the printing. You guys totally rock.
Our plan is to meet in Zuccotti Park Tuesday morning, September 17th, which is the 2nd anniversary of the occupation, give a wee press conference at 10am or so, and then hand out hundreds of copies of the book to whomever shows up.
Here’s the wrap-around cover to give you just a taste:
See you guys on Tuesday! The event is also on Facebook.
Yet another aspect of Gary Shteyngart’s dystopian fiction novel Super Sad True Love Story is coming true for reals this week.
Besides anticipating Occupy Wall Street, as well as Bloomberg’s sweep of Zuccotti Park (although getting it wrong on how utterly successful such sweeping would be), Shteyngart proposed the idea of instant, real-time and broadcast credit ratings.
Anyone walking around the streets of New York, as they’d pass a certain type of telephone pole – the kind that identifies you via your cell phone and communicates with data warehousing services and databases – would have their credit rating flashed onto a screen. If you went to a party, depending on how you impressed the other party go-ers, your score could plummet or rise in real time, and everyone would be able to keep track and treat you accordingly.
I mean, there were other things about the novel too, but as a data person these details certainly stuck with me since they are both extremely gross and utterly plausible.
And why do I say they are coming true now? I base my claim on two news stories I’ve been sent by my various blog readers recently.
[Aside: if you read my blog and find an awesome article that you want to send me, by all means do! My email address is available on my "About" page.]
First, coming via Suresh and Marcos, we learn that data broker Acxiom is letting people see their warehoused data. A few caveats, bien sûr:
- You get to see your own profile, here, starting in 2 days, but only your own.
- And actually, you only get to see some of your data. So they won’t tell you if you’re a suspected gambling addict, for example. It’s a curated view, and they want your help curating it more. You know, for your own good.
- And they’re doing it so that people have clarity on their business.
- Haha! Just kidding. They’re doing it because they’re trying to avoid regulations and they feel like this gesture of transparency might make people less suspicious of them.
- And they’re counting on people’s laziness. They’re allowing people to opt out, but of course the people who should opt out would likely never even know about that possibility.
- Just keep in mind that, as an individual, you won’t know what they really think they know about you, but as a corporation you can buy complete information about anyone who hasn’t opted out.
In any case those credit scores that Shteyngart talks about are already happening. The only issue is who gets flashed those numbers and when. Instead of the answers being “anyone walking down the street” and “when you walk by a pole” it’s “any corporation on the interweb” and “whenever you browse”.
After all, why would they give something away for free? Where’s the profit in showing the credit scores of anyone to everyone? Hmmmm….
That brings me to my second news story of the morning coming to me via Constantine, namely this TechCrunch story which explains how a startup called Fantex is planning to allow individuals to invest in celebrity athletes’ stocks. Yes, you too can own a tiny little piece of someone famous, for a price. From the article:
People can then buy shares of that player’s brand, like a stock, in the Fantex-consumer market. Presumably, if San Francisco 49ers tight end Vernon Davis has a monster year and looks like he’s going to get a bigger endorsement deal or a larger contract in a few years, his stock would rise and a fan could sell their Davis stock and cash out with a real, monetary profit. People would own tracking or targeted stocks in Fantex that would depend on the specific brand that they choose; these stocks would then rise and fall based on their own performance, not on the overall performance of Fantex.
Let’s put these two things together. I think it’s not too much of a stretch to acknowledge a reason for everyone to know everyone else’s credit score! Namely, we can can bet on each other’s futures!
I can’t think of any set-up more exhilarating to the community of hedge fund assholes than a huge, new open market – containing profit potentials for every single citizen of earth – where you get to make money when someone goes to the wrong college, or when someone enters into an unfortunate marriage and needs a divorce, or when someone gets predictably sick. An orgy in the exact center of tech and finance.
Are you with me peoples?!
I don’t know what your Labor Day plans are, but I’m getting ready my list of people to short in this spanking new market.